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RECENT APPROACHES TO THE TRADE OR BUSINESS
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 174: UNAUTHORIZED SNOW
REMOVAL
Daniel S. Goldberg*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code is a "tax incentive"
provision designed by Congress to encourage investment in startup research and development activities by permitting a current tax
deduction for expenditures which would otherwise be considered
capital expenditures. As with many tax incentive provisions, one
might quarrel with the wisdom of using the tax code to encourage
specific activities or expenditures and a strong argument could certainly be made against Congressional enactment of that kind of
expenditure. Exercising its legislative prerogative, however, Congress chose otherwise, and it is the responsibility of the Department of the Treasury and the courts to carry out the legislative
will of Congress.
Like many tax-incentive provisions of the Code, however, section
17 4 has inspired its share of abusive tax shelters formed solely to
generate artificial tax losses. Several of those shelters have found
their way to the Tax Court and a few appellate courts. Instead of
focusing on the abusive aspects of those cases, however, courts
have often issued very broadly-written opinions. In doing so, they
may have planted the seeds for virtually precluding the availability
of section 174 for all but established companies, in contravention
of Congress' clear legislative intent.
The leading cases share the same basic fact pattern. A partnership (or S corporation) engages in questionable research activities,
but prior to the time any research is actually done, the entity, in
substance, disposes of any interest it may have in the new technology in exchange for a stream of royalty payments from a licensee.
Generally, the licensee is either the company that has also been
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Of Counsel, Frank,
Bernstein, Conaway and Goldman, Baltimore, Maryland. The author wishes to express his
gratitude to Lana S. Ward, an associate at Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, for her
assistance in preparing this article.
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hired to do the research or an affiliate of that company. 1
In these cases, the courts have correctly held that the taxpayers
did not incur research and development expenses in connection
with a trade or business and, therefore, were not entitled to a current deduction for their purported research and development expenses. The licensee firms, which owned the technology, incurred
the expenses of research and development rather than the taxpayers. Any opportunity the taxpayers had to engage in a trade or
business involving the creation or exploitation of the new technology was precluded by the licensing of the technology prior to any
research expenses which the taxpayer might have incurred.
In several recent technical advice memoranda and in cases in litigation, however, the Internal Revenue Service has indicated that
it will attempt to broaden the scope of ~he disallowance to situations in which the technology has not been pre-sold. 2 The Service's
attempts have been bolstered by judicial opinions in which the
courts have not been content to rest their analyses on easily supportable grounds, 3 choosing instead to focus on the "trade or business" issue. In doing so, the courts have clouded the clear guidance
on the "trade or business" issue under section 174 provided by the
Supreme Court in Snow v. Commissioner" and have thereby set
the tax law back fifteen years by creating unwarranted uncertainty
on the law. This article asserts that the Supreme Court would have
reversed its holding in Snow if it had applied the literal application of the post-Snow decisions. Accordingly, that language should
be disregarded as inconsistent with Snow.
As a starting point for the analysis, this article examines the legislative history of section 174 and the historical background of
Snow. After a discussion of the Snow case, the article reviews the

See Green v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 667 (1984) (research contractor received an immediately effective and comprehensive right to exploit any technology it developed) and its
progeny Spellman v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 298 (1986), affd, 845 F.2d 148 (7th
Cir. 1988) (the license agreement was entered into prior to the research activity and precluded the taxpayer from entering the business area in which the research was to be conducted) and Levin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 698 (1986), affd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987)
(upon execution of the research and development interest the exploitation rights were simultaneously sold).
• See Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,802,007 (September 30, 1987); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,749,006 (August 14, 1987); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,725,001 (March 10, 1987).
• See infra notes 28 to 51 and accompanying text.
• 416 u.s. 500 (1974).
1

HeinOnline -- 8 Va. Tax Rev. 862 1988-1989

1989]

863

Unauthorized Snow Removal

post-Snow decisions and their discussion of the "trade or business"
issue. Next, to prevent the loose reasoning of the post-Snow opinions from obliterating section 174's true purpose, the article suggests the proper mode of analysis of the "trade or business" issue
under section 174. Finally, a hypothetical is used to demonstrate
the correctness and efficacy of the article's proposed analysis. The
implications of the analysis and discussion, however, extend far beyond section 174. The implications underscore the importance of
careful reasoning in tax cases and the need to avoid analysis based
solely upon the "smell test."~
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

17 4

AND THE

Snow

CASE

Section 174(a)(1) provides, "A taxpayer may treat research or
experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as
expenses which are not chargeable to capital account. The expenditures so treated shall be allowed as a deduction." 6 In general, expenditures for the creation of an asset must be capitalized and
added to the basis of that asset. 7 Thus, under general principles of
capitalization, research expenses would not be currently deductible
but rather would have to be capitalized as a cost of the technology
or patent. Section 174, however, by election of the taxpayer, provides two functions: (1) it allows a current deduction for an expenditure that would otherwise have to be capitalized and included in
the basis of the technology developed; and (2) it allows a current
deduction for what otherwise would constitute pre-opening expenses. Even before the enactment of section 174, the Commissioner accepted the currently deductible nature of research costs in
the context of an ongoing business if it was consistent with the
taxpayer's method of accounting. Section 17 4, in part, codified the
Commissioner's position. 8 The Internal Revenue Service's and re. • See infra notes 28 to 51 and accompanying text.
• I.R.C. §174{a)(l).
7
See I.R.C. §263{b).
• The Treasury's original position regarding research expenditures was very similar to the
treatment currently provided in §17 4 regarding that aspect. Article 168 of Regulations 45,
62 and 65 provided:
A taxpayer who has incurred expenses in his business for designs, drawings, patterns,
models, or work of an experimental nature calculated to result in improvement of his
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cent court attacks on research and development expense deductions, however, appear to focus on the latter of the two functions of
the section.
The key consideration is that these attacks should not hinder
the primary purpose for which section 174 was enacted, which is to
encourage research and development expenditures by smaller enterprises.9 Section 174 was enacted to cure a problem which President Eisenhower summarized in his budget message to Congress in
1954:
At present, companies are often not permitted to deduct currently
for research or development expenses. This rule is especially burdensome to small concerns because large companies with established research laboratories can usually get immediate deductions.
I recommend that all companies be given an option to capitalize or
to write-off currently their expenses arising from research and development work. Our tradition of initiative and rapid technical im-

facilities or his product, may at his option deduct such expenses from gross income
for the taxable year in which they are incurred or treat such articles as a capital asset
to the extent of the amount so expended.
Reg. 65, Art. 168 (1924).
The option provided by the Treasury in 1924, however, was short-lived. In 1925, the
Board of Tax Appeals rendered two decisions which led to the withdrawal of the option to
deduct or capitalize. In both of these cases, taxpayers who had previously deducted research
expenses as ordinary and necessary expenses attempted to retroactively change their
method of accounting and capitalize their research and experimental expenditures. See
Goodell-Pratt Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 30 (1925); See also Gilliam Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 967 (1925). The Board of Tax Appeals sided with the taxpayer in both
cases. As Judge Trammell stated: "The taxpayer has no option to treat expense items as
capital or capital expenditures as ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or
business and had a right, as it did, to change its erroneous accounting methods." Gilliam
Mfg. Co., 1 B.T.A. at 970.
Apparently, the Service still believed in the wisdom of allowing a current deduction for
research expenditures, but was unwilling to permit taxpayers to retroactively change their
method of accounting in order to take advantage of more valuable deductions after a tax
rate increase. In 1952, the Commissioner stated that the policy of the Service was to allow a
deduction of research costs in cases in which the taxpayer had adopted a practice of expensing them under its "established method of accounting." Commissioner's statement to the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 525 CCH 1!6170 (April 4, 1952). The apparently unintended implication of the Commissioner's statement was that in order to currently deduct research costs, a business must have had a history of research and development expenditures. The implication resulted in discrimination against small or beginning
businesses, and that discrimination was the primary motivating force behind the legislative
response embodied in §174.
• See infra notes 10 through 13 and accompanying text.
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provements must not be hampered by adverse tax rules. 10
During debate on section 174's passage, Congressman Reed, then
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, aptly
stated the important rule which Congress intended for the section:
Very often, under present law, small businesses which are developing new products and do not have established research departments are not allowed to deduct these expenses despite the fact
that their large and well established competitors can obtain the deduction. . . . This provision will greatly stimulate the search for
new products and new inventions upon which the future economic
and military strength of our Nation depends. It will be particularly
valuable to small and growing businesses. 11
Section 174, however, went further than merely codifying existing law. Section 174, like section 162( 2 requires a "trade or business" to support a deduction. Unlike section 162, however, which
requires a taxpayer to be engaged in "carrying on" a trade or business, section 174 requires only the lesser standard that the expenditure be "in connection with" a trade or business. Section 174 allows a current deduction for expenses that would be regarded as
"start-up" expenses for purposes of section 162. 13
•• Budget Message, 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1557, 1567.
11
H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d. Sess., 100 Cong. Rec. 3425 (1954).
12
Section 162 provides, in part, "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. . . ."
13
The Congressional discussions during consideration of §174 indicated that Congress intended to provide special favorable treatment for start-up expenses in the nature of research
and development expenses. Congress did this in order to prevent discrimination against taxpayers engaged in research activities without ongoing businesses and provide an incentive
for small or beginning businesses to engage in research and development work.
The report of the House Ways and Means Committee on General Revenue Revision, 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) echoed this theme:
The present policy is helpful only to taxpayers which have a prior practice of expensing such costs. It discriminates against all others, including new taxpayers. In order to
avoid discrimination and treat all taxpayers on an equal basis, irrespective of past
accounting practices, the Internal Revenue Code should ... be amended to give all
taxpayers the option to expense or capitalize research and development expenditures.
Id. at 944.
See also the resolution adopted by the Council of State Chambers of Commerce, which
was made a part of the House Ways and Means Committee Report on General Revenue
Revision, at 958 and which states: "A wider latitude in the allowance of depreciation, obsolescence, and the research type of costs would encourage the development of new enterprises, the promotion of new products, and the expansion of production and employment."
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The seminal judicial interpretation of section 174 was Snow u.
Commissioner 14 in which the taxpayer was a limited partner in the
Burns Investment Company, which was a partnership formed to
develop a special purpose incinerator. The partnership had made
expenditures in connection with the development of the incinerator and had thereby incurred losses in the year at issue. 111
The partnership deducted these expenditures under section
174(a)(1) of the Code, which allows a taxpayer to take as a deduction "experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred by him
during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as
expenses which are not chargeable to capital account." 16 The partnership, however, had made no sales of incinerators in the year at
issue. 17
The Service disallowed as a deduction the taxpayer's distributive
share of the partnership's net operating loss on the grounds that
the partnership was not yet engaged in a trade or business during
the year at issue. The Supreme Court, noting the many references
to the words "trade or business" throughout the Code, held that
the taxpayer was entitled to his distributive share of partnership
losses because the partnership had incurred those expenses "in
connection with" its trade or business. 18

I d. at 958. See also the remarks of Representative Camp, Revenue Revision Act, 82nd Cong.,
1st. Sess., 97 Cong. Rec. 4326 (1951):
In order to clarify the existing confusion in respect of the tax treatment of such expenditures, and to prevent tax discrimination between large businesses having continuous programs of research and small or beginning business enterprises, [§174] provides generally that expenditures made in industrial or commercial research ... may,
at the election of the taxpayer, be deducted as expenses or capitalized and charged
off over a period selected and designated by the taxpayer.
Id.
The Treasury Department also understood that the intended purpose of §174 was to encourage research by new or small business enterprises. During the course of the enactment
of the 1954 Code, Undersecretary Marian B. Folsom presented a summary of the principal
provisions of H.R. 8300 to the Senate Finance Committee. During this presentation, he indicated that the existing treatment of research and experimental expenditures discouraged
research and was "(e]specially restrictive for small businesses" and that §174 would "(h]elp
small, pioneering businesses." Senate Finance Committee Hearing on H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. 105 (April 7, 1954) .
.. 416 u.s. 500 (1974).
'" See id.
16
I.R.C. §174(a)(l).
17
See 416 U.S. at 502.
16
See id. at 503-04.
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In the Court's view, the phrase "in connection with" contained
in section 17 4 of the Code, encompasses activities engaged in by
the taxpayer in the area of research and development, even though
the taxpayer has not yet begun the actual sale of products it developed. 19 The Court reasoned that a more relaxed standard for deductibility under section 174 than under section 162 emanated
from Congress' intent to equalize treatment with regard to research and development expenditures between rich taxpayers and
poor taxpayers. 20
In the Supreme Court's view, to have required taxpayers to be
already engaged in activities of selling products to qualify for the
research and development deduction would have caused disallowance of deductions for small businesses which are developing new
products and do not yet have established research departments.
Nonetheless, large and well established competitors would have
been allowed deductions for those same expenditures. 21 Such a result would have been unusual and inappropriate for a provision
which was designed specifically with small and growing businesses
in mind. 22

•• See id. at 503. The sale of goods and services is no longer a prerequisite to deductibility
under §162. See infra notes 63 to 70 and accompanying text.
•• See 416 U.S. at 503 .
., See id. at 504.
•• See id. at 503-04. Although the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 17 4 reveals one
pervasive theme which is that §174 was intended to encourage research and development
work by "small or beginning business enterprises" in start-up situations- several courts,
including the Tax Court, were not willing to give such broad effect to the new section after
its enactment. See generally, Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: Will Snow
Fall?,. 27 Tax Lawyer 381 (1974) (discussing the history of §174 prior to the Snow decision).
In 1960, and again in 1961, the Tax Court had an opportunity to apply §174 to new enterprises. In Cleveland v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 517 (1960), affd in part, rev'd in part, 297
F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1961), the taxpayer, Cleveland, had been advancing funds to an inventor
attempting to develop an inorganic liquid binder for at least 12 years prior to the enactment
of §174. Prompted by the enactment of §174, Cleveland and Kerla, the inventor, entered
into a "trust agreement" in 1956, reducing their understanding to writing. The agreement
provided that the inventor was to spend his full time working on the invention and that
Cleveland held a one-half interest in the invention. The Tax Court held that the agreement
failed to create a partnership or joint venture and, therefore, Cleveland was not engaged in
business with Kerla. ld. Instead, the Tax Court held that the funds advanced by Cleveland
subsequent to the written agreement were lo,m,; to the inventor. ld.
In partially reversing the Tax Court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated, "if there was a joint venture in which both men were active participants, the
actual expenditures by Kerla for research and experimentation could be deducted by Cleveland since they were incurred in connection with his trade or business." Cleveland, 297 F.2d
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The Supreme Court did not explicitly set forth the meaning of
at 172. The Court went on to hold that the parties were involved in a joint venture and that
the funds advanced subsequent to the agreement were deductible under §174: "In this instance the decision of the parties to the agreement to define their relationship so as to take
advantage of the benefits of the statute was in harmony with the purpose of the enactment
to encourage expenditures for research and experimentation." Id. at 173.
The facts of Cleveland do not indicate that the invention was ever actually marketed or
that any patent was applied for. Yet the Court of Appeals did not question the existence of
a trade or business as that term is used in §174. (The continuing nature of the equal coownership in Cleveland has recently been used to distinguish Cleveland from other research
and development cases on the grounds that the capital partner did not retain a significant
ownership interest after the research contractor licensed the technology. See infra note 114
and accompanying text.
Before the appellate court issued its opinion in Cleveland, the Tax Court was confronted
with another new enterprise case under §174 in Koons v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1092
(1961). Koons had purchased all rights to an invention which was in a stage of very early
development. Koons then contracted with the seller, a research laboratory, to complete the
development work. The Service challenged Koons' deductions for research expenditures
under §17 4 as not incurred in connection with a trade or business. The Tax Court held that
the term "trade or business" as contemplated in §174 required a "going" or "existing" trade
or business. ld. at 1100. Interestingly, the Court cited only those portions of the legislative
history which did not refer to "new" or "beginning" enterprises. The Tax Court then analogized to cases decided under §162 and concluded that the developmental expenditures involved in Koons were not made in connection with an existing trade or business, and therefore were not deductible. ld. at 1101.
It was against that background that the case of Snow v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 585 (1972)
reached the Tax Court. In that case the taxpayer, Snow, was one of three limited partners in
the Burns Investment Company partnership. The partnership was formed in July of 1966 by
Trott, an inventor, in order to secure funds necessary for further development of a new type
of incinerator. Trott contributed all right, title and interest in the incinerator to the partnership, and the limited partners contributed capital. Burns Investment Company hired
Crossbow, Inc. to perform all the shop work necessary for further development of the incinerator. Id. On its 1966 tax return, Burns Investment Company reported a net operating loss
in excess of $36,000. During 1966, Burns Investment Company was not involved in selling
the incinerator or any other product. On these facts the Tax Court held that the expenditures paid in 1966 were not incurred "in connection with" the trade or business of the partnership since the partnership was not in a trade or business in 1966. The court stated, "In
1966 Trott had hardly begun experimentation upon the trash burner, the application for a
patent was not made until 1968, the advance of funds was made only in 1966 and no effort
to market or sell the device was attempted until several years later." Id. at 595. Citing its
earlier decision in Koons, the Tax Court found that since Burns Investment Company "was
not holding itself out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services[,]" the research
expenditures were not incurred in connection with an existing trade or business. ld. at 597.
Thus, the Tax Court extended its holding in Koons to incorporate the full "trade or business" test of §162.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the imposition of the trade or business requirement of §162. The court stated, "[i]t seems clear to us, as it did to the Tax Court, that
Burns Investment Company in 1966 was not holding itself out to others as being engaged in
the selling of goods and services." 482 F.2d 1029, 1031 (1973). The court held that the expenses incurred by Burns Investment Company in 1966 were "pre-operating" expenses and,
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the "trade or business" language in section 174. The outcome in
Snow, however, suggests a liberal application of the term. Under
the Snow decision, section 174 does not require that the taxpayer
be engaged in carrying on a trade or business. In 1966, the year in
issue, the Burns Partnership had no office, telephone, or separate
facility of any kind. No patent had been applied for, and the partnership itself did no work on the invention. Instead, the partnership hired a company owned by the general partner to perform engineering and development services. 23 Although the regulations
under section 174 provide that a deduction will be allowed for expenditures incurred on behalf of the taxpayer by another person or
organization, in Snow, there was no written contract between the
partnership and the company performing the development
services. 24
More importantly, under Snow, a taxpayer need not ever carry
on a trade or business within the meaning of section 162. Snow
conceded that the partners had not made any marketing efforts on
behalf of the Burns Partnership in 1966. In fact, the partnership
never made any attempt to market the product at all. Before a
patent was issued in 1970, the partnership incorporated to produce

thus, were not deductible under §174. Id. at 1032. When confronted with the legislative
history of §174, the Court stated: "We cannot hold that the comment previously quoted
from Representative Camp concerning 'beginning enterprises' demonstrates a Congressional
intent to set aside the settled interpretation of the language 'trade or business' as used in
§174." Id. at 1032. This holding by the Sixth Circuit created a clear conflict with the holding
of the Fourth Circuit in Cleveland, and thus set the stage for review by the Supreme Court.
In his brief to the Supreme Court in Snow, the Commissioner argued that by incorporating the "trade or business" language in §174, Congress made clear its intent to incorporate
the "trade or business" requirement of §162. Brief for the Respondent at 11, Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974). However, the Commissioner failed to recognize the language
in §174 which distinguishes it from all other Code sections. Section 174 provides a deduction
for research expenditures "in connection with" a taxpayer's trade or business. In contrast,
§162 provides a deduction for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business(emphasis added)." It was precisely that
distinction that formed the basis for the Supreme Court's opinion.
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the Commissioner and held that the language and requirements of §162 were "not helpful" in construing §174. 416 U.S. at 503. In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the legislative history of §174. In
the Court's opinion, imposing the stringent standards of §162 upon the more liberal provision of §174, would result in the same discrimination that Congress intended to alleviate by
enacting §174. ld. at 504.
•• See Brief for Respondent at 5, 416 U.S. 500.
•• See id.
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and market the device. 211 Thus, it is clear that the Burns Partnership never engaged in carrying on a trade or business within the
meaning of section 162 and perhaps never intended to do so.
The Court, however, presupposed that Snow was in the preopening phase of a trade or business without discussing what constitutes that phase. In general, the pre-opening phase of a trade or
business ends when the activities for which the enterprise was
formed begin with a bona fide, good faith expectation of profit.
Courts, however, differ regarding which events trigger the commencement of these activities. 26
The Service has recently begun to attack certain transactions as
not being within the pre-opening stage of a trade or business because the taxpayer never intended to carry on a trade or business.
It is on this critical issue that the Service has demonstrated its
failure to understand the concept of "trade or business" and the
Supreme Court's holding in Snow.

III. Green

AND ITS PROGENY: THE RECENT EROSION OF

Snow

For several years following the Snow decision, there were no decided cases. The Service itself was silent. During those years, however, many research and development partnerships were formed
based upon the holding of the Snow decision that a current deduction under section 174 did not require the taxpayer to be currently
engaged in carrying on a trade or business. The Department of
Commerce encouraged such ventures, providing blueprints for
structuring them, virtually in kit form. 27
In 1984, judicial silence came to an end with the Tax Court's
decision in Green v. Commissioner, 28 which formed the cornerstone
of the Service's recent attacks on the "trade or business" issue.
The Green case was followed by Spellman v. Commissioner29 and
•• See id. at 5-6.
•• See, e.g., Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874 (Cl. Ct. 1982); McManus v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. 475 (1987); Richmond Television Corp. v. U.S., 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.
1965), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). Presumably, future regulations promulgated under §195 will end this controversy.
27
See e.g., Information and Steps Necessary to Form Research and Development Limited
Partnerships, U.S. Department of Commerce, (December 31, 1983), P.B. 84-156058.
•• 83 T.C. 667 (1984).
•• 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 298 (1986), afrd, 845 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Levin v. Commissioner, 80 both of which were affirmed for the
Commissioner on appeal, and by several subsequent Tax Court
and Tax Court Memorandum cases. 31
The Green case involved a limited partnership ("LaSala") which
in December of 1979 acquired four inventions from several inventors. On the same day that the partnership acquired those inventions, it executed a research and development agreement and an
exclusive license agreement with a patent development company
("NPDC"). Under the terms of the exclusive license agreement,
NPDC was granted an immediate, worldwide license to commercialize, manufacture, sell and otherwise exploit the inventions. 32
LaSala claimed a deduction under section 174 for research and experimental expenditures in the amount of $650,000, which it paid
for further development of the inventions during the period after
the effective date of the licensing agreement.
The Service challenged LaSala's deductions for research and development expenses because those expenditures related to a period
after the date of the disposition of the inventions to NPDC under
87 T.C. 698 (1986), affd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., Diamond v. Commissioner, 92 Curr. Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. (CCH) No. 25, Dec.
45,497 (1989)(deduction denied when option could be exercised wwithout cost and partnership was otherwise precluded from obtaining a patent for the device developed); Moore v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. 1989·38 (January 24, 1989)(Partnership denied deductions under
§17 4 for suspect research in a transaction devoid of profit motive to the partnership and in
which the option to license the resulting technology was prearranged or a foregone conclusion). McManus v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 475 (1987), affd, 865 F.2d 255 (4th Cir.
1988)(S corporation that purportedly was to conduct research on developing a prototype
mud logging device, which had precluded itself from all activities to exploit the technology,
like the partnership in the Green case, was denied research and development expense deduction) and Property Growth Company v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1072
(1988)(sustained Commissioner's disallowance of the taxpayer's research and development
expense deduction). See also, Ben-Avi v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 199 (1988) (contemporaneous license precluded trade or business); Goulding v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M.
(CCH) 846 (1988) (expenditures for research in ginsing cultivation disallowed where partnership retained no rights in the technology). Other cases involving suspect research have
been decided against taxpayers based upon lack of profit motive. See e.g., Mack v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 735 (1988) (expenditures for development of a calorie consumption
monitor, "DietMate", disallowed on the basis of lack of profit motive where research, if any,
was suspect, and transactions allegedly involved a Virgin Island partnership, a Hong Kong
research contractor, and financing from a Swiss bank without documentation); Myslisz v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 818 (1988) (profit motive lacking where the taxpayer
owned the technology, but failed to monitor the progress of the research, could not realize a
profit without tax benefits and where the technology was not "stand alone" technology).
32
See 83 T.C. at 668-72.
30
31
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the terms of the exclusive license agreement. 33 The Tax Court held
that the exclusive license agreement between LaSala and NPDC
constituted a sale of those inventions. 34 Because the sale took place
before LaSala made its research and development expenditures,
these research costs were not expended in the partnership's behalf.
Rather, the court stated that these expenditures represented an acquisition cost of NPDC's promise to pay a stream of royalties to
LaSala. The LaSala partnership could never enjoy the benefits of
the research, other than through royalty participation, because it
had already divested itself of all rights to the inventions. Moreover, the Tax Court held that the expenditures could not have
been made "in connection with" any trade or business because,
prior to making these expenditures, the partnership had precluded
itself from entering into a trade or business through the exploitation of the research. 311 Nor could LaSala be considered to be in the
trade or business of research for future exploitation because it had
already sold its rights to any product that might arise from the
research. 36 Therefore, based on the simultaneous purchase and sale
agreements through which LaSala sold the very technology it
claimed to be developing, the Tax Court concluded that the partnership had carried on solely investment activities because it functioned only "as a vehicle for injecting risk capital into the development and commercialization" of the inventions. 37
Research and development activity, whether done by a partner
or someone else for the LaSala partnership, clearly would have established the partnership as being engaged in a trade or business if
those activities were done on the partnership's behalf. In the
Green case, however, the activities were engaged in on behalf of
NPDC, the licensing corporation, rather than the partnership.
Therefore, those activities did not establish the partnership in the
trade or business.
Since the research activities were not done on LaSala's behalf,
the court examined the other activities of the partnership to determine whether those activities were sufficient to constitute a trade
••
••
••
••
••

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

678.
684.
685-91.
691.
687.
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or business. Those activities, however, consisted purely of ministerial activities such as maintaining bank accounts and making deposits.38 The court likened LaSala's royalty interest in the development and commercialization of the inventions to that of an
investor in securities. The partnership had no ownership interest
in the inventions and no control over their actual development,
production or marketing. Rather, the partnership only maintained
an interest in the investment because the purchase price under the
license agreement was contingent upon future sales by the
licensee. 39
The Tax Court's opinion in the Green case, however, is far from
a model of clarity. The language of the opinion could be read to
give the investment factors discussed by the court significance independent of the simultaneous licensing arrangement on which the
court based its conclusion that the taxpayer had no trade or business. To grasp the importance of the Green case, one must examine it in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Snow. Given
such an analysis, the simultaneity of the licensing and research and
development agreements takes on crucial significance.
Two later Tax Court cases, Spellman v. Commissioner" 0 and
Levin v. Commissioner41 expressed the significance of this relationship much more clearly. Indeed, these cases indicate that a taxpayer's entitlement to a research and development deduction
under section 174 of the Code will depend on whether that taxpayer has, in effect, sold (i.e., licensed on an exclusive basis) the
technology prior to the conduct of the research activity.
In Spellman, the taxpayer was a limited partner in a partnership
created to invest in another limited partnership, Sci-Med, which
was formed for the purpose of engaging in the research, development and exploitation of certain antibiotic drugs. An Israeli pharmaceutical company, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.
("Teva"), agreed to undertake a research and development program for Sci-Med under a sub-research and development agreement. On the same day the parties entered into the research and
development agreement, Sci-Med granted Teva the sole and exclu••
••
••
.,

ld. at 688.
Id. at 688-89.
52 T.C.M. (CCH) 298 (1986), affd 845 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1988) .
87 T.C. 698 (1986), affd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987).
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sive worldwide license to manufacture and sell the products that
resulted from the technology developed as well as the right to sublicense the technology.' 2
The Tax Court held that Sci-Med was not entitled to any research and development deduction under section 174 of the Code." 3
In so holding, the court clearly identified the simultaneous research and exclusive license agreements as the single significant
factual finding because the simultaneity of these agreements ensured that all of Sci-Med's rights to. the technology developed
would belong to Teva even before research was conducted. As a
result, any research conducted pursuant to the research agreement
would necessarily be for the benefit and account of Teva rather
than Sci-Med. Accordingly, Sci-Med could not be entitled to the
section 174 deduction. Indeed, as the court itself stated:
Since the exclusive license agreement was entered into by Sci-Med
prior to the commencement of any research or experimental activities, Sci-Med was effectively precluded from ever having a substantial right in the results of the said activities, and from ever using
the results of the research or experimental activities in connection
with its own trade or business, present or future. Sci-Med's role
was exclusively that of a financing vehicle, injecting risk capital
into the venture. Its activities never, and could have never, surpassed those of an investor. ••
As the above-quoted passage from the Court's opinion indicates,
the existence of current trade or business activities or even the assurance of future trade or business activities by the taxpayer is not
the essential factor in determining whether a taxpayer's research
expenditures were made "in connection with a trade or business."
Rather, the ability to engage in a trade or business in the future is
the touchstone.
In affirming the decision of the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit emphasized the importance of the pre-licensing by pointing out that "the plan might have worked if SciMed had had good prospects of entering the pharmaceutical business.""11 However, the pre-licensing of virtually all of the technol..
••
..
••

52 T.C.M. (CCH) at 300-01.
ld. at 310 .
Id. at 307.
Spellman v. Commissioner,845 F.2d. at 151.
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ogy, other than "by-products" (which were subject to an option exercisable for only $20,000), prevented Sci-Med, as a practical
matter, from ever entering the pharmaceuticals business. 46
In the Spellman case, as in the Green case, the taxpayer's exclusive license of virtually all of the technology to another firm prior
to the actual research precluded the taxpayer from ever carrying
on a trade or business in connection with the technology developed. One may fairly infer from both the Spellman and Green
opinions that, but for the preclusion of any future exploitation of
the technology engendered in the pre-licensing agreement, the taxpayer's position would have been sustained.
Similarly in Levin v. Commissioner, 47 the taxpayer, a limited
partner in a partnership organized to develop, manufacture, and
market food packaging systems, sought a section 174 deduction
even though the partnership had simultaneously executed a research, manufacturing, and marketing agreement with another
firm. The Commissioner contended that the partnership was precluded by contractual arrangements and by design from ever engaging in any trade or business. The. court articulated the question
as follows: "[W]e must decide only whether the partnerships were
engaged, at any time, in the trade or business in connection with
which funds were expended for research and . experimentation
within the meaning of section 174."48 Under the court's formulation of the issue, the Commissioner prevailed because the simultaneous execution of the manufacturing, marketing and development
agreements effectively precluded the taxpayer's partnership from
being "capable of ever engaging in trades or businesses."49 The
manufacturing and marketing agreements, which may or may not
have effected sales of the packaging machinery inventions, effectively deprived the partnership of control over the manufacture,
use and sale of the developed machines for virtually the entire life
of the partnership. In the absence of these agreements, however,
the court could not have concluded that the partnership would or
could never enter into a trade or business in the future. 60
•• Id.
•• 87 T.C. 698 (1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987).
•• Id. at 725.
•• ld. See also id. at 726-28.
•• In its opinion in Levin, the court looked past the technical and legal issues involved in
the case, and instead emphasized that the research at issue was suspect. The court's interest
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in distinguishing Snow, emphasized that the partnership in Snow invested in the development of the ideas of its general partner, an
inventor. Moreover, the court stated that in Snow, "the partnership expected to produce and sell the machines itself, if development efforts were successful."111 In contrast, the partnerships in
Levin were formed only to supply cash so that inventions could be
developed by others. Further, the general partner was not an inventor and had no experience with food machinery.
Thus, the facts of the case, in the court's view, contained four
serious obstacles that the taxpayer needed to overcome in order to
prevail. First, the research was suspect. Second, the accrued deduction for research services was based upon a future liability stated
in declining currency. Third, the general partner of the partnership
was not an inventor. Fourth, the partnership never actually intended to sell the inventions in Israel or anywhere else. 152
The courts in Green, Spellman, and Levin all reached the appropriate result. The language in the opinions of these cases, how-

was also piqued by the method of payment under the several agreements, which suggested a
currency-swap arbitrage. The taxpayer sought an accrual for the current value of a liability
payable in Israeli currency several years in the future. Because of the rate of inflation and
decline of the Israeli currency, it was predictable, almost to a certainty, that the value in
U.S. dollars of the contractual liability would be substantially less than the original accrual.
The accrual is significant because it overstates the true amount of the liability for future
payment in U.S. dollars. 87 T.C. at 716-20.
Under §461(h), the test for determining when an expense is deductible for an accrual
method taxpayer is the "all events test." Under the all events test, in general, an expense of
an accrual method taxpayer is deductible in the taxable year in which: (1) "all the events
have occurred which determine the fact of the liability;" and (2) the amount of the liability
"can be determined with reasonable accuracy." See also Treas.Reg. §1.461-1(a)(2).
The amount of the §461(h) deduction is the face amount of the liability for future payment, without discounting to present value. The rule has substantial support in the case law
dating back almost to the inception of the income tax laws. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); Lawyer's Title Guarantee Fund v. United States, 508 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1975). It recently has been reaffirmed by the Tax Court in Burnhaum Corp. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 953 (1988)(accrual of estimated amount of settlement payments was
proper where the settlement agreement specified the amount of each monthly payment
which was to be paid until the death of the payee and taxpayer used actuarial tables to
determine life expectancy). In Levin as well as other Green progeny, by previous license
agreement, the taxpayer had precluded itself from ever engaging in any trade or business
with regard to the technology because the technology was developed at a time when the
taxpayer had no ownership interest in it.
•• 832 F.2d at 405, citing Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974).
•• See id.
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ever, was imprecise and overly broad, suggesting an improper analysis which could undermine the Congressional purpose for enacting
section 174.
IV.

A SuGGESTED ANALYSIS oF THE TRADE OR BusiNESS IssuE
UNDER SECTION 174.

The critical fact in the Green case and its progeny was that the
taxpayers were in all respects non-participants. From the inception
of the transactions, none of the participants was ever going to own
or exploit the technology. All of the situations represented merely
financing devices disguised by meaningless agreements. In that
sense, they were similar to typical sale-leaseback financing arrangements. Under those arrangements, the nominal ownership of
the lessor is ignored for tax purposes. Instead, the lessee is entitled
to the tax benefits of the arrangement, such as depreciation deductions, because he bears the benefits and burdens of ownership. 63
Section 174 was not designed to artificially shift deductions for research and development expenses, and the transactions in Green
and its progeny represented crude attempts to do just that.
Yet, several of these cases appear to rest their decisions more
generally on the taxpayer's lack of a trade or business, rather then
simply the circularity of the transactions and the taxpayer's lack of
ownership of the technology. To the extent that these decisions
rely on the "trade or business" analysis, they are misleading. Ac•• See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.
1985)(purchase of used computer equipment with recourse and nonrecourse notes for price
in excess of fair market value followed by leaseback was a sham lacking economic substance); Beck v. Commissioner, 678 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982)(partnership denied interest
deduction where purchase price and nonrecourse indebtedness incurred by the partnership
greatly exceeded the fair market value of property securing the debt); Hilton v. Commissioner 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982)(purchase-leaseback was
not a genuine multi-party transaction with economic substance where there was no possibility of economic profit or gain); Sun Oil v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1977)(conveyance of 320 parcels of unimproved service station sites at
cost to a tax-exempt trust, with leaseback, was mere financing transaction where lessee bore
all risks and burdens of ownership of the property and guaranteed a fixed return); Johns v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 442 (1987)(sale-leaseback between related taxpayers lacked
business purpose, economic substance and reasonable chance of profit, and was designed
solely to obtain tax benefits); But see, Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561
(1978)(sale-leaseback shall be respected where there is a genuine multi-party transaction
with economic substance and when compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities and imbued with non-tax considerations)

HeinOnline -- 8 Va. Tax Rev. 877 1988-1989

878

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 8:861

cordingly, the trade or business issue should be put in proper
perspective.

A.

Trade or Business

Although the Supreme Court in Snow declined to define the
term "trade or business," it recently dealt with the concept more
definitively in Commissioner u. Groetzinger. 54 In Groetzinger, the
Supreme Court held that a gambler who gambled on a full-time
basis solely for his own account was in a "trade or business" for
purposes of the minimum tax provisions of the Code, and presumably for purposes of other provisions of the Code as well. In so
holding, the Supreme Court rejected the requirement that a taxpayer must offer goods or services to be considered engaged in a
trade or business. 1111 Instead, the Court stated: "To be engaged in a
trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity
with continuity or regularity and . . . the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit." 116
In Groetzinger, the taxpayer relied upon his gambling activity
for his livelihood, although he had certain investment income as
well. The court indicated that the activities of a gambler could be
seen in three different ways: (1) as a trade or business, (2) as a
mere "hobby or a passing fancy" such as "an occasional bet for
amusement," and (3) as an investment. 117 An occasional gambler's
losses would likely be regarded as non-deductible personal consumption rather than losses incurred in either a trade or business
or a transaction entered into for profit. The fact that Groetzinger
gambled for a livelihood took his activity out of the realm of per... 480 u.s. 23 (1987).
•• This view is generally attributed to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Deputy
v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940); see also Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 30-31.
.. 480 U.S. at 35. Although the Supreme Court looked to the taxpayer's "primary purpose" for engaging in the activity for purposes of distinguishing a profit-seeking endeavor
from pure pleasure, a primary purpose test is not the appropriate test to apply in situations
where there is no question of pleasure or personal consumption benefits. Rather, in those
cases and, particularly, in cases involving specific "tax incentive" provisions such as § 174, a
"good faith profit motive" should be the applicable test. See Warren, The Requirement of
Economic Profit in Tax Motivated Transactions, 59 Taxes 985 (1981). As suggested above,
§17 4 is such a tax incentive provision and was specifically designed to encourage the precise
behavior engaged in by Research One and its constituent partners. The Department of
Commerce Blueprints, supra note 27, confirm this conclusion.
07
480 U.S. at 33-34.
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sonal amusement and into one of the other two categories of
activity.
Moreover, the continuity of Groetzinger's activity and the objective to make a profit from his personal energies rather than from
appreciation in property took the activity out of the investment
category and placed it in the trade or business category. Groetzinger was unlike a taxpayer whose "expenses [were] incident to
caring for one's own investments even though that endeavor is fulltime."58
The Court, in its words, applied a "common-sense concept of
what is a trade or business," 59 which required "an examination of
the facts in each case,"60 however unsatisfactory that may be. To
the extent this is an unsatisfactory resolution, the Supreme Court
left repair or revision, if any was needed, to Congress. But, in the
context of research and development, Congress has already spoken
through its enactment of section 174. As the Supreme Court recognized in the Snow case and reiterated in Groetzinger, section
162(a) "is more narrowly written than is Section 174."61
Thus, a taxpayer satisfies the trade or business test of section
162 (and, therefore, a fortiori, section 174) if (1) the activities are
undertaken with a profit motive, (2) the activities are sufficiently
regular and continuous, and (3) the activities constitute a business
rather than an investment. 62
Two questions then remain when an activity is undertaken with
a profit motive. The first is whether the taxpayer's for-profit activities, even if regular and continuous, constitute an investment
rather than a business. The second is whether the regular and continuous activities performed by persons on behalf of the taxpayer
may be attributable to the taxpayer in establishing that his activity was regular and continuous so that the taxpayer is engaged in a
trade or business .
.. Id. at 31. The Court had previously held that an investor's expenses are not deductible
as paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business under §162. Higgins v. Commissioner,
312 U.S. 212 (1941), but see I.R.C. §212(2), which would allow a deduction for such
expenses.
•• Id. at 35.
•• ld. at 36.
•• Id. at 31, quoting Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503 (1974).
•• The Tax Court has already indicated that it will likely adopt this view. See Smith v.
Commissioner, 91 Curr. Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. (CCH) No. 48, Dec. 45, 110 (1988). See also Lee,
supra note 22, for a discussion of this view prior to the Snow decision.
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With regard to whether the taxpayer's activities constitute a
busine&s or an investment, the Supreme Court in Whipple u. Commissioner63 held that the mere purchase and sale of assets for current income and appreciation was insufficient to establish a trade
or business under section 166. In Whipple, the taxpayer was the
majority shareholder of a bottling corporation to which he had
loaned substantial amounts of money. When those debts later become worthless, the taxpayer sought an ordinary deduction for the
losses as business bad debts under section 166. The Commissioner,
however, viewed the debts as non-business bad debts, which would
be treated as a short-term capitalloss. 64 Thus, like section 174, the
availability of an ordinary deduction under section 166 depends
upon a distinction between business activities and investment
activities.
The Court held that Whipple was a mere investor and, therefore,
not engaged in the trade or business of organizing and financing
corporations:
Though such activities may produce income, profit or gain in the
form of dividends or enhancement in the value of an investment,
this return is distinctive to the process of investing.
[F]urnishing management and other services to corporations for a
reward no different than that flowing to an investor . . . is not a
trade or business. 811

The Court distinguished those cases in which the taxpayer was
held to be in business because he received compensation for his
efforts other than the normal investor's return or because he
sought to immediately sell the corporations at a profit. Therefore,
the Whipple case suggests that the existence of a trade or business
under section 166, as distinguished from an investment, depends
•• 373 u.s. 193 (1968) .
.. See generally I.R.C. §166(d)(2). Section 166(d)(2) provides:
(d) NONBUSINESS DEBT~.(2) NONBUSINESS DEBT DEFINED-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term
"nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade or
business of the taxpayer's or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayers
trade or business.
" Whipple, 373 U.S. at 202.
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upon a finding that the taxpayer's anticipated profit derived from
the taxpayer's services rather than market appreciation. 88 This test
can be referred to as the "taxpayer efforts test."
A similar conclusion can be drawn under section 1221, although
with less than unanimous support in the case law. In general, prior
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, gain from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset received treatment under the Code preferential to
that accorded ordinary income. Therefore, the distinction between
an investment and a trade or business under section 1221 was of
major importance. A capital asset is broadly defined in section
1221 of the Code to mean "property held by the taxpayer", but
specifically excludes, inter alia, "property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business. "87
In George R. Kemon, 68 the Tax Court addressed the question of
whether a partnership which- regularly engaged in the purchase
and sale of many different securities held those securities as an
investment or for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. The court applied the taxpayer efforts test, stating that the
critical distinction was the following:
[T]hose who sell 'to customers' are comparable to a merchant in
that they purchase their stock in trade, in this case securities, with
the expectation of reselling at a profit, not because of a rise in
value during the interval of time between purchase and resale, but
merely because they have or hope to find a market of buyers who
will purchase from them at a price in excess of their cost. This
excess or mark-up represents remuneration for their labors as a

•• The Court went on to explain that in order to establish a trade or business of organizing and promoting businesses for resale, "petitioner must show that the entities were organized with a view to a quick and profitable sale. . .. It is the early re-sale which makes the
profits income received directly for services." ld.
In a subsequent case, Deely v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1081, 1092-93 (1980) the Tax Court
applied and explained the distinctions raised by the Supreme Court in Whipple in the context of §166. The Tax Court focused entirely on whether the taxpayer's anticipated gain was
to be derived directly for his services:
In order to establish a business separate from that of his corporations, petitioner
must sh(lw that the compensation he seeks from his activities is other than the normal investor's return and that income received is directly for his services rather than
indirectly through successful operation of the corporate enterprise.
Id. at 1093.
67
I.R.C. §1221(1).
•• 16 T.C. 1026 (1951).
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middle man bringing together buyer and seller and performing the
usual services of retailer or wholesaler of goods. 89

The court described these persons as "dealers" and distinguished
them from mere "traders" who depend upon such circumstances as
a rise in value or an advantageous purchase to enable them to sell
at a price in excess of cost. 70
Kemon indicates that, at least as applied to securities trading,
analysis of whether the taxpayers' profits derived in the ordinary
course of a trade or business under section 1221(1) turns upon the
same factors discussed above in connection with sections 162 and
166 of ·the Code. The majority of cases arising under section
1221(1), however, involve the purchase and sale of real estate.
These cases seemingly create an inconsistent pattern that cannot
be reduced to a single statement of the law. Indeed, courts have
even stated that earlier decisions on essentially the same facts do
not have precedential effect. 71 Nevertheless, in many of these irreconcilable and unpredictable cases, the same three factors emerge
as the primary means used to distinguish between business activities and investment activities: namely, the taxpayer must: 1) engage in substantial activity with some degree of continuity; 2) with
a profit motive; 3) which profit does not depend upon market appreciation.72 To be sure, there are several significant cases decided
•• Id. at 1032-33.
70
Id. at 1033; see also Currie v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 185, 199 (1969).
71
See, e.g., Houston Endowment, Inc. v. United States, 606 F.2d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1979).
The single consistent characteristic of opinions concerning real estate sales under Section
1221(1) is a recitation of factors somewhat different from those used in other areas. Those
factors include: (1) whether the dispositions of property extend over a long period of time,
(2) whether there are numerous rates, (3) whether taxpayer made substantial improvements,
and (4) whether taxpayer had engaged in sales efforts. See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United
States, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
72
In Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1980), [hereinafter
Suburban], cert denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980), for example, the court noted that, "[i)n the
principal recent cases, there has always been a conjunction of frequent and substantial sales
with development activity relating to the properties in dispute." Id. at 176 (citations omitted). This view clearly coincides with the factors used to establish a trade or business under
other sections of the Code - substantial activity with profits to be derived from taxpayer
efforts.
Indeed, even in §1221 cases, the Service has frequently urged the adoption of the taxpayer
efforts test. In Buono v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 187 (1980), the Tax Court declined to adopt
that test, although it was urged by the Commissioner. In that case, the taxpayer purchased
one tract of land, subdivided it, and sold it in bulk to one purchaser. The Tax Court refused
to impose ordinary income treatment, but based its holding on the lack of continuing sales
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under Section 1221(1) that genuinely apply a multifactor test
rather than the taxpayer efforts test. 73 However, a close examination of the precedents in this area reveals that those cases that
have applied a multifactor test rely heavily on the factors that require taxpayer efforts, and would be decided the same way if the
taxpayer efforts test were applied.
Divergence from the taxpayer efforts test in section 1221 can be
explained by noting that section 1221 contains requirements in addition to a finding of a trade or business; namely that the taxpayer
must sell to customers in the ordinary course of that trade or business. The requirement of selling to customers explains the divergence. There is no similar requirement under sections 162, 166 or
174. Indeed, the Supreme Court on several occasions has described
a "business" as "that which occupies the time, attention and labor

of real estate. See id. at 200. In addressing the question of taxpayer efforts, the Court
stated:
The fact that a substantial amount of appreciation is due to the taxpayer's activities
is, of course, a significant factor to consider in making this determination. However,
such does not, standing alone, necessarily require a finding that the taxpayer's property is excluded from the capital asset definition by section 1221(1). Id. at 205 n. 25.
Rather, the focus of the inquiry is whether the taxpayer's activities rise to the level of
a trade or business.
Id. at 205. (emphasis added)
From this statement, one could infer that the number and substantiality of sales is essentially a "busyness" test, requiring some degree of continuity and substantial sales activity in
order to establish that the taxpayer is in the business of selling real estate. Thus, the two
factors cited as most important are: 1) substantial activity; and 2) taxpayer improvements.
This conclusion is further supported by the Tax Court's earlier decision in Bush v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 340 (1977), affd, 610 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1979).
In Bush, like Buono, there was only one sale of real estate. However, the taxpayer in Bush
spent considerable time and energy in acquiring adjacent parcels of real estate, negotiating
the construction of an apartment building, engaging a design firm and related activities.
Before any construction occurred, however, the taxpayer sold the entire tract to one buyer.
In holding that the taxpayers had entered the real estate business, the court focused exclusively on the source of the gain. In spite of a lack of continuing sales activity, the court
stated that the "key" to its determination was that the gain recognized was primarily attributable to the taxpayer's efforts in accumulating the parcels into a unified tract. Id. at 349.
Even in the absence of substantial sales, courts have occasionally found enough activity to
amount to a trade or business. See, e.g., Jersey Land & Development Corp. v. United States,
539 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that while taxpayer did not make frequent sales of its
alleged inventory real estate, the gain was due to taxpayer improvements, not market appreciation, and was taxable as ordinary income).
73
See, e.g., Suburban, 615 F.2d at 171, which demonstrates that courts frequently decide
factually indistinguishable cases inconsistently. Compare Commissioner v. Williams, 256
F.2d 152 (1958) with S & H, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 234 (1982).
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of men for the purpose of [earning] a livelihood for profit.""
Thus, an analysis of the trade or business issue under other sections of the Code reveals that the line between business and investment appears to be drawn by the element of personal services
and their impact on the ultimate profit of the activity. A for-profit
endeavor which depends upon substantial services for its ultimate .
profit would constitute a business, whereas an endeavor in which
profit is derived primarily from capital appreciation is more in the
nature of an investment. The extent of the activity, although a significant factor, is not determinative. Even a taxpayer, as in Whipple, who spent substantial amounts of time studying, buying and
selling investment assets would be a mere investor because the
profit of the endeavor depends primarily on market appreciation.
Applying the analysis to section 174, it becomes clear that the
creation of technology through research and development activities
with an intent to derive a profit should constitute a trade or business. Research and development activities involve labor and the
expenditures of time and effort of a personal service nature in the
creation of a valuable asset. These activities are far different than
the investment activities described in the Whipple case and should
not be characterized as such. 711
As the foregoing discussion indicates, substantial research and
development activities conducted for profit clearly fall within the
concept of a trade or business under any section of the Code, albeit
the pre-opening phase of a business. The second question that
must be addressed is whether a taxpayer can satisfy this requirement if all, or substantially all, of the activity is conducted by an
independent contractor on behalf of the taxpayer. Clearly, if the
taxpayer himself were conducting all of the research activities,
those activities would be sufficient to place the taxpayer in the
74

Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911).
•• A finding of sufficient taxpayer efforts for a trade or business, however, should not
overcome the additional qualification in the context of §162 that pre-opening expenses are
not deductible, and it would appear to be an unwarranted extension of the holding in the
Groetzinger case to contend otherwise. Rather, pre-opening expenses represent one aspect
of capitalization, which was not at issue in the Groetzinger case. One strongly suspects that
the non-allowability of a current deduction for pre-opening expenses will continue to remain
intact in the tax law. Nevertheless, as long as research activity would satisfy the trade or
business requirement of Groetzinger, those research expenses would be deductible under
§174, because § 17 4 represents a statutory exception to the pre-opening expense limitation of
§162.
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pre-opening stage of a trade or business, regardless of whether the
taxpayer was ever going to manufacture products. Can the activities of an independent contractor of the taxpayer also satisfy this
requirement?
The Treasury's regulations in the context of section 174 answer
the question affirmatively and leave no room for doubt. In contrast
to the current pattern of voluminous regulations with myriads of
exceptions, the regulations issued under section 174 are refreshingly clear and simple. These regulations expressly contemplate
the use of research contractors to perform the research and development work for the taxpayer who is entitled to the section 174
deduction. The regulations, in part, provide as follows:
The provisions of this Section apply not only to costs paid or incurred by the taxpayer for research or experimentation undertaken
directly by him but also to expenditures paid or incurred for research or experimentation carried on in his behalf by another person or organization (such as a research institute, foundation, engineering company, or similar contractor). 76

Although under other sections of the Code, most notably section
1221, courts often distinguish between an independent contractor
and an agent based upon the degree of taxpayer control, 77 this distinction should not be the case under section 174. 78
76

Treas. Reg. §1.174-2(a)(2). See also Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, and Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8,614,004 (November 25, 1985) evidencing the Service's view that, at least under §174,
the activities of an independent contractor may be attributed to the taxpayer.
77
Under §1221, the taxpayer who owns land to be subdivided and who procures the services of a sales agent to sell the subdivided lots to customers will generally recognize ordinary income on the sale because the property will be regarded as held by the taxpayer for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. The taxpayer generally
cannot insulate himself from that result by using a sales agent in lieu of actively soliciting
sales himself.
In Achong v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 445, (9th Cir. 1957), the court attributed the activities of a broker to the taxpayer when the taxpayer had the right to approve the final subdivision plans and the cost of improvements. Id. at 447. In that case, lot prices were to be
agreed upon by the taxpayer and the broker; the taxpayer bore all expenses of developing
and improving the property; and the broker's books were open to inspection. Id. at 446. See
also Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 419 (5th Cir. 1976) , cert. denied,
429 U.S. 819 (1976)(the brokers "did not so completely take charge ... as to permit the
[taxpayer) to wall itself off legally from their activities.").
78
The Tax Court in Smith v. Commissioner, 91 Curr. Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. (CCH) No. 48,
Dec. 45, 110 (1988), however, recently left this question-open, but suggested in an offhanded
way that direct taxpayer involvement may be required under the trade or business requirement of §174, where the taxpayer's profit motive was questionable. See also Drobny v. Corn-

HeinOnline -- 8 Va. Tax Rev. 885 1988-1989

886

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 8:861

Most of the cases under section 1221 that distinguish between an
agent and an independent contractor on the basis of taxpayer control are not applicable to cases involving section 174. They can be
explained by reference to the additional requirement in section
1221 that property be held for "sale to customers." To find a capital asset under section 1221, one must conclude that the customers
are those of the selling agent and not the owner of the property.
The amount of taxpayer control over the agent is probative of this
question. The greater the owner's control, the more likely it will be
that the prospective purchasers are the owner's customers. 79
missioner, 86 T.C. 1326, 1343-48 (1986). Both of these cases suggested the significance of
direct taxpayer involvement in the context of sham transactions devoid of economic substance, indicating that lack of taxpayer control over management of the activity is a factor
supporting a finding of sham, but otherwise has no impact on the technical requirements of
trade or business.
70
In Bauschard v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960), even though the taxpayer
was totally "walled-off' from the developer, the court attributed the developer's activities to
the taxpayer. Id. at 118. The taxpayer, a Catholic priest, purchased the property in issue
along with the local pharmacist in order to prevent the construction of a low cost housing
development in their residential community. Title to the property was taken in the name of
two trustees. The trustees leased the property to a real estate developer for five years. It was
understood that during the term of the lease the developer intended to subdivide and improve the property at his own expense. The trustees also granted the developer an option to
purchase any or all of the lots at an undetermined price. The developer organized a corporation to which he assigned his interest in the lease. The corporation then subdivided and
improved the property and solicited sales of the lots. As each lot was sold by the corporation, the trustees signed a deed and thereby transferred title directly to the purchaser. In
all, there were sixty-five separate sales involving twenty-three purchasers. ld. at 117. Even
though the property was under option to the developer for a fixed price, and the taxpayer
had no control over the developer, the court held that the property was held by the taxpayer
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. See id. at 118.
Interestingly, the court stated that the taxpayer's single sale argument might have merit if
the option for the property as a whole had been exercised before the development and sale
of the lots. See id. However, in Voss v. United States, 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964), the
taxpayer engaged a developer to subdivide a sixty-acre parcel and improve the subdivision
with streets and utilities. The developer was solely responsible for marketing and selling the
lots and all of the improvement expenses were paid out of the sales proceeds. The court
declined to attribute the developer's activities to the petitioner because in its view the developer was an independent contractor as opposed to an agent. In so holding, the court
emphasized that the developer had total discretion in setting the prices and incurring expenses. The taxpayer's only activity was to sign the deeds to transfer title. See id. at 167.
Indeed, the facts of Bauschard are analogous to the typical research and development
arrangement where a taxpayer which owns rights in basic technology essentially engages an
outside firm to perform further development work and grants an option to the research
contractor to purchase the new developments. Under Bauschard, as long as the option is not
exercised prior to the development, the activities of the contractor should be attributed to
the taxpayer. Conversely, if the option is exercised and a sale takes place prior to the devel-
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Furthermore, the language of the regulations clearly indicates
that the activities of an independent research contractor should be
attributed to the taxpayer under section 174 without regard to the
degree of the taxpayer's control over the contractor. It is almost
axiomatic that a taxpayer may conduct his business through an
agent and nevertheless be engaged in business. 80
Indeed, the Treasury's recently issued regulations under section
355 indicate acceptance of this view. In general, section 355 permits a corporation to distribute or "spin-off' stock in an another
corporation which it controls to its shareholders without recognition of gain to itself or to the recipient shareholders, if the specific
requirements of the section are satisfied. One of the requirements
is that both the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation must be engaged in the "active conduct of a trade or business" immediately after the distribution. 81 The new regulations interpret this requirement, in part, by defining trade or business as
"a specific group of activities that are being carried on by the corporation for the purpose of earning income for profit, and the activities included in such group include every operation that forms a
part of, or a step in, the process of earning income or profit.... " 82
The active conduct of a trade or business, which is the actual requirement under section 355 for tax-free treatment, provides that
each corporation must not only have a trade or business, but also
that "the corporation is required itself to perform active and substantial management and operational functions. Generally, activities performed by the corporation itself do not include activities
performed by persons outside the corporation, including independent contractors." 83 It follows, therefore, that the Treasury's position regarding the definition of trade or business within the meaning of section 355 is consistent with case law and permits business
functions to be conducted by an independent contractor on behalf

opment work, the activities of the "agent" are no longer on behalf of the principal and
therefore cannot be attributed to the principal. The latter situation was precisely the situa·
tion in Green v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 667, 691 (1984) and logically justifies the court's
holding in that case.
•• See Reiner v. United States, 222 F.2d 770, 771 (7th Cir. 1955); Kaltreider v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 833, 838 (3rd Cir. 1958).
•• I.R.C. §355(a)(1)(C) and (b)(1).
•• Treas. Reg. §1.355-3(b)(2)(ii).
•• Treas. Reg. §1.355-3(b)(2)(iii).
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of the taxpayer.
Moreover, the recent enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
confirms that an owner of a business need not be active to be engaged in a trade or business. Section 469, enacted under the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, contains the passive activity loss rules which
deals, in part, with the tax treatment of a taxpayer who has only
minor involvement in a trade or business. 8 " In substance, these
rules preclude a taxpayer from using losses from a passive activity
("passive losses") to offset nonpassive income. Nonpassive income
includes income from salaries, investments and other sources other
than from passive activities. 86
A passive activity is defined, in part, as "[a]ny activity which
involves the conduct of any trade or business, and in which the
taxpayer does not materially participate."86 A taxpayer is "treated
as materially participating in an activity only if the taxpayer is involved in the operations of the activity on a basis which is (A) regular, (B) continuous and (C) substantial."87 The section clearly
contemplates, therefore, that even though an activity may be conducted on behalf of a taxpayer, if the activity constitutes a trade or
business, it is sufficient to qualify the taxpayer as carrying on a
trade or business. 88 The entire concept upon which the passive activity loss rules are based would be meaningless if a taxpayer could
be precluded from carrying on a trade or business by virtue of the
taxpayer's lack of personal involvement in performing services.

B.

Application of the Suggested Analysis to a Basic
Hypothetical Case

A hypothetical case, modeled on the Green case, 89 can be studied
in light of the foregoing discussion of trade or business to demon•• I.R.C. §469.
•• See generally Goldberg, The Passive Activity Loss Rules: Planning Considerations,
Techniques, and a Foray into Never-Never Land, 15 J. Real Est. Tax'n 3 (1987)(describing
the scope and policy objectives of Section 469).
•• I.R.C. §469(c)(1).
87
Section 469(h). It is also interesting to note that §469(c)(5) specifically includes in the
term "trade or business" for purposes of the section any activity involving research or experimentation within the meaning of §174.
88
For example, the sole proprietor of a twenty-person law firm who does no legal work
himself is of course engaged in a trade or business as long as he derives the profits from the
firm's trade or business activities.
•• See Green v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 667 (1984).
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strate that the analysis suggested in this paper is the proper analysis. The study will demonstrate the weakness of the Service's current position and the inexactitude of recent judicial analysis. The
hypothetical will also facilitate a critical examination of the factors
which recent courts have highlighted as significant in holding that
research expenses were not in connection with a trade or business.
Assume a partnership (the "Partnership") contracts with an independent contractor (the "Research Company") to perform research for the Partnership under a research contract. Under the
agreement, ownership of, and all rights to, the technology developed (the "New Technology") by the Research Company belong to
the Partnership as developed. All patents will be in the name of
the Partnership.
A prospective licensee (the "Licensee") would like to license the
technology on an exclusive worldwide basis and the Partnership is
well aware of this desire. Assume also that the bona fides of the
research are beyond question and therefore not at issue. Finally,
assume that all research expenditures by the Partnership to the
Research Company are made in cash.
Under the facts of the hypothetical, the Partnership should be
entitled to a current deduction under section 174 for its payments
to the Research Company. This conclusion is based squarely on the
Supreme Court's holding in Snow v. Commissioner. 90
The Service has indicated that it will challenge the Partnership's
research and development expenses in cases like that presented by
the hypothetical as not being in connection with a trade or business.91 The Service may contend that the Partnership never "engaged in" a trade or business because it never sold physical products or actively attempted to license the New Technology to
multiple licensees on a nonexclusive basis. On the contrary, by hiring the Research Company to conduct research for the creation of
New Technology and intending to exploit the New Technology for
profit through licensing, the Partnership would satisfy the trade or
business requirement of section 174.
Nevertheless, the Service and several courts have somehow
found significance in various extraneous factors present in the hy•• 416 u.s. 500, 504 (1974).
•• See supra notes 29 to 40 and accompanying text.
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potheticaP2 These factors include the following: (1) the general
partner of the Partnership was not an inventor by trade; (2) all of
the actual research work was done by an independent contractor
rather than employees of the Partnership; (3) the Partnership
never intended to, and indeed never did, manufacture or sell products using the technology; (4) the licensee of the technology was
the same company or an affiliate of the company hired to perform
the research (and, perhaps, that company was granted a bona fide
option to license the technology); and (5) the transaction somehow
appears "abusive."98 These factors, however, have no independent
significance in the context of section 174.
(1)

The General Partner Is Not an Inventor; and

(2) All of the Actual Work Is Done by an Independent
Contractor.
Assume that the Partnership had hired the Research Company
to perform research services for the Partnership. Developments
and advances by the Research Company would be for the account
of the Partnership and any patents or technology developed would
belong to the Partnership. The activities of the Research Company
should be imputed to the Partnership as if the general partner of
the Partnership had performed that activity. Otherwise, juridical
entities like partnerships and corporations could never be deemed
to be engaged in a trade or business because these entities can only
act through agents. Indeed, as discussed above, the Treasury regulations are abundantly clear that a taxpayer is entitled to the deduction under section 174 for amounts expended by the taxpayer
for research services performed on the taxpayer's behalf. 9 " The deduction is available even if the Partnership's intention is to dispose
of the technology in a one-shot transaction. The critical inquiry is
the nature of the activity and not the taxpayer's personal involvement in the activity.
Reversing the situation, assume that the general partner is an.
inventor. Assume further that the technology has been licensed to
•• See, e.g., Levin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 698, 725-28 (1986), affd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th
Cir. 1987).
•• See supra notes 28 to 39 and accompanying text.
04
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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the Licensee before the research has been undertaken. In this situation, the Partnership will be engaged in research activities because of the work of the general partner-inventor. The Partnership, however, will be engaging in those activities on behalf of
someone else, namely the Licensee, who owns the technology as it
is developed. In this capacity, the Partnership becomes similar to
the Research Company in the initial hypothetical. Any expenses
that the Partnership incurs will be expenses under section 162 of
the Code because it will be carrying on the business of performing
research for another. The nature of the activities as research in the
experimental sense would be treated no differently than if the
Partnership were engaged in constructing a house under contract
with a customer. The research nature of the activity would be irrelevant to the Partnership's deductibility of the expenses.
Similarly, the Licensee, the company for whom the Partnership
is working, has hired the Partnership to perform research activities
for it. The regulations under section 174 clearly contemplate that
the Licensee, having research performed on its behalf, should be
entitled to the deduction under section 174 rather than being required to capitalize these expenses and add them to the basis of
any technology or patent that is developed. 911 Section 174 is
designed to provide a current deduction for expenditures that
would ordinarily be capitalized under general capitalization principles or the principle of pre-opening expense. 96 The Partnership
would never be required to capitalize its costs of performing research services for another. Absent section 174, the employing
company, however, would be required to capitalize those expenditures. Therefore, section 174 is available only to the employing
company to convert its otherwise capitalized expenditure to a currently deductible expense.
Thus, the technical background and white lab coat attire of the
general partner does not go to the question of whether the research
and development expense deduction is that of the Partnership.
Nor can it preserve the deduction for the Pctrtnership if the Partnership is performing those services on behalf of someone else. It is
irrelevant under section 174 that the owner of the technology is
also the inventor. Hiring employees or an independent contractor
•• See id.
98
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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to perform research services for the owner is sufficient to entitle
the partnership to the deduction for qualifying expenditures under
section 174.

3. The Partnership Never Intended, and Indeed Never Did,
Manufacture or Sell Products Using the Technology.
The fact that the Partnership never intended to manufacture a
product with the technology is also irrelevant. As long as the Partnership does not pre-license the technology to the Licensee, either
as a legal or practical matter, the Partnership should be entitled to
the research and development deduction under section 174 of the
Code because the research and development would be done on the
Partnership's behalf. The deduction should be allowed regardless
of whether the research activities were successful and the Partnership manufactures the product, whether the technology is successful and the Partnership licenses the technology to another firm to
manufacture the product, or whether the research was a failure so
that manufacturing was not pursued.
If the deduction hinged on whether manufacturing ultimately
commenced, then only those companies that were successful in
pursuing research and development would be entitled to deduct
their research expenses. Start-up companies would be denied a deduction unless the technology proved economically exploitable,
which is precisely what Justice Douglas was concerned about in the
Snow case. 97 Under such a construction, only well-financed companies that had ongoing sales could be assured of a deduction.
Moreover, only research performed by companies that would ultimately use the technology to manufacture products or perform
services would be allowed a deduction under this restricted view of
section 174. Thus, a high-tech research company that had insufficient capital to start a manufacturing facility which instead licensed its technology to large airplane or automobile manufacturers could never be allowed a section 174 deduction because it
would never be in any trade or business other than conducting
research.
Nor should developing the technology with the intention of
granting an exclusive license after the technology was developed
07

See Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503-04 (1974).
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preclude a section 174 deduction on the theory that there was insufficient marketing activity. Rather, the section 174 deduction
should be allowed because the Partnership is in the trade or business while the research is being conducted. The period before licensing might be considered the pre-opening phase of the trade or
business. But, section 174 was designed to grant a deduction for
expenses in the pre-opening phase for small companies that were
not yet well established. 98
If a taxpayer's intention to exploit the technology in a particular
way were relevant, at what point would one determine whether the
taxpayer would use the technology in a trade or business? Would
one have to wait to see whether the taxpayer ever commenced to
"carry on" a trade or business before allowing the research and
development deduction, even though the research expenses may
have been made several years before the sales activity begins?
Quite the contrary must be true. Under the annual accounting system, each year must stand on its own. It would be inconsistent
with general tax accounting principles to force a taxpayer to hold
open his tax year until it is certain he has commenced to "carry
on" a trade or business, in the government's view, in subsequent
years. The research could last four or five years, in which event the
statute of limitations would have closed on the first year of research. The proper year for the deduction is the year in which the
expense was paid or incurred, and there is no specific statutory
provision for holding open the statute of limitations on research
expenses.
Furthermore, to deny the deduction to the Partnership as the
owner of the technology would preclude anyone from getting the
deduction. None of the other players has any claim to it. The Research Company is simply performing services for another and the
Licensee is simply purchasing technology and must capitalize its
cost. 99 If research is performed, a deduction under section 174
should be available, and the taxpayer on behalf of whom the re•• See id.
•• See Treas. Reg. §1.174-2(a)(2). See also Treas. Reg. §1.174-2(a)(3), Example (3), which
provides that no deduction for research expenditures will be allowed where the taxpayer
hires another to develop a specific product under a performance guarantee, since the taxpayer has not incurred any risk. For a discussion of the risk element, See Natbony, Tax
Shelters and Section 174: Research and Experimental Expenditures in the Tax Shelter Context, 4 J. Tax'n lnv. 19, 27 (1986).
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search is done is the most appropriate candidate to receive the
deduction.
Thus, the test of trade or business should look to who owns the
technology as the technology is developed. Unlike the Green case
and its progeny, the taxpayer in Snow owned the technology as it
was being developed and had not sold it prior to the research work
being done. In all subsequent Commissioner victories on this issue,
that was not the case.
Some courts, however, have suggested that one should look to
the taxpayer's intent as to whether they planned to enter into the
business of manufacturing products or performing services using
the technology. Such an approach would unduly restrict the concept of "trade or business," in contravention of the Supreme
Court's decision in Groetzinger which rejected the requirement
that taxpayers must offer goods or services to be in a trade or
business. 100

4. The Licensee of the Technology is the Same Company or an
Affiliate of the Company Hired to Perform the Research.
The identity of the licensee of the technology and the person
performing the actual research work at first blush would seem to
indicate that the Partnership, situated between the two, is merely
providing financing. But, suppose the arrangement begins with the
Partnership hiring the Research Company to perform research services. Assume also that at some time after the initial agreement,
the Research Company becomes enamored of the technology being
developed and offers to purchase the technology through a license
providing royalty payments to the Partnership. Under these circumstances, the license of the technology to the Research Company should have no effect on the initial deductibility of the research and development expenditures under section 174 because at
the time these expenditures were made, they· represented expenses
for research performed on behalf of the Partnership, which owned
all rights to the technology.
In this situation, there are two transactions occurring. First,
under the research contract, the Research Company performed the
research services for the Partnership for a fee. The second transac100

480

u.s. 23, 35 (1987).
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tion occurs under the license agreement through which the Partnership licensed the technology back to the Research Company. As
long as these two transactions were separate transactions and the
license agreement occurred after the technology was developed, the
subsequent license agreement should have no effect on the deductibility of fees for research services paid by the Partnership.
Now, suppose that at the time the research work was being performed, the Partnership had already licensed the technology to be
developed back to the Research Company. The Partnership would
not be entitled to a deduction under section 174 because the Partnership never had rights to the technology and the technology was
not developed on the Partnership's behalf. This result is the holding of the Green case and the cases following Green. 101
In Green and the cases which followed, the Service challenged
the taxpayer's deductions for research and development expenses
because these expenditures related to a period after the date of the
disposition of the inventions to the licensee. 102 The courts held
that the exclusive license agreement between the taxpayer and the
licensee constituted a sale of those inventions. Because the sale
took place before the taxpayer incurred the research and development expenditures, the research costs were not expended on the
taxpayer's behalf. Rather, the expenditures represented, in the
courts' view, an acquisition cost of the licensee's promise to pay a
stream of royalties to the taxpayer. 103 All of these cases indicate
that a: taxpayer's entitlement to a research and development deduction under section 174 will depend on whether that taxpayer
has, in effect, sold (i.e., licensed on an exclusive basis) the technology prior to incurring the research expenses. 104
In contrast, the Partnership in the hypothetical owned the new
technology as it was developed. It was assigned all of the patents to
the new technology as they were obtained. It had all rights to that
technology, and was not obligated to license the technology to anyone. In that situation, the separate identities of the Research Company and Licensee would make it clear that the research and licensing agreements were separate transactions.

101
102
10

~

104

See
See
See
See

supra notes 28 to 39 and accompanying text.
id.
id.
id.
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Although, as a technical matter, the identity of the Research
Company and the Licensee is legally irrelevant, as a practical matter, the identity causes one to question whether the two transactions are interrelated and not separate. Assume now that the Partnership entered into the research contract with the Research
Company and also granted the Research Company an option to acquire the technology in the future, after the technology was developed. The existence of the option should be irrelevant to the treatment of the expenditures unless the option is viewed, in substance,
as a sale at the time of grant. The appropriateness of that view
depends upon the legal and tax nature of an option.
The overwhelming case law authority holds that an option is not
a sale and does not transfer ownership of the subject property for
tax purposes. 106 However, if the option were certain of being exercised, such as when the option is exercisable at a nominal price,
then it would be considered a sale for tax purposes and not truly
an option. 106 Thus, as long as the exercise is not a foregone conclusion, any sale brought about by exercise of the option should be
viewed as an independent transaction.
The granting of an option to license the technology to the Research Company, however, may raise practical factual questions.
These factual questions can be dispelled if, during the time the
technology is being developed, there are no side agreements to li100

See Koch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 71, 88 (1976), acq. 1980-2 C.B. 1. The grantor is
taxed when the option is exercised or lapses. At the time of exercise of the option, the
transaction constitutes a completed sale. See Commissioner v. Dill Co., 294 F.2d 291, 300-01
(3d Cir. 1961); See Hunter v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. 1944); Virginia Iron,
Coal, Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 195, aff'd, 99 F.2d 919, 921 (4th Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939). The principal is also followed by the Internal Revenue Service.
See Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279; Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. Moreover, even
where the amount of the option payment exceeds the basis of the underlying property (so
that the optionor will receive a profit in any event), the courts have consistently taken the
position that the grant of the option is not a sale of the underlying property and is not a
taxable event. See, e.g., Hunter v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Dill Co., 294 F.2d 291, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1961); Hicks v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M.(CCH) 1540, 1546 (1978); Helmer v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 727, 730-31 (1975).
'oe Property Growth Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1072, 1075 (1988); Diamond
v. Commissioner, 92 Curr. Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. (CCH) No. 25, Dec. 45,497 (1989)(deduction
denied when option could be exercised wwithout cost and partnership was otherwise precluded from obtaining a patent for the device developed); Moore v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
1989-38 (January 24, 1989)(Partnership denied dedusctions under §174 for suspect research
in a transaction devoid of profit motive to the partnership and in which the option to license the resulting technology was prearranged or a foregone conclusion).
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cense and the technology is exploitable by someone other than the
Research Company-Licensee.
Of course, by the granting of the option, the Partnership has
transferred away some of the potential upside of the transaction.
The transfer of some upside potential, however, occurs in all option situations and is not unique to the research situation. The
transfer of upside potential should have no effect on the availability of research and development expense deductions. The existence
of the option, therefore, is legally irrelevant to an analysis of deductions under section 174.
To be sure, a form of pre-licensing may be deemed to take place
without a formal license agreement if the technology to be developed was so restricted or of so limited use as to be unsalable to
anyone but the prospective licensee. 107 In that event, the ultimate
licensing to the prospective licensee may be regarded as so certain
as to preclude the nominal owner from having a full ownership interest in the technology. However, the prospective Licensee, which
would typically be the Research Company, would not yet have the
full ownership interest either. Therefore, it would be inappropriate
to treat the technology as pre-licensed to that Licensee.
If it is clear at the inception of the research that the technology
will not be exploitable by someone other than the Research Company-Licensee, but it has not been pre-licensed, then the relationship between the Partnership and the Research Company is best
characterized as a joint venture. The allocation of deductions for
research and development expenses between the Partnership and
the Research Company would be governed by section 704(b) of the
Code and the regulations thereunder, which, in substance, allocate
the deductions on the basis of who bears the risk of economic loss
from unsuccessful research. 108 In cases in which the Partnership
contributed money for the research, the Partnership would be entitled to the allocation of deductions attributable to the
contributions.
The definition of a joint venture is well established in the opinions of the Tax Court. A joint venture has been defined as "a special combination of two or more persons, where in some specific
venture a profit is jointly sought without any actual partnership or
107
108

See generally notes 102 to 104 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. §704(b).

HeinOnline -- 8 Va. Tax Rev. 897 1988-1989

898

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 8:861

corporate designation." 109 As the Court stated in Podell v. Commissioner, the elements of a joint venture are:
(a) a contract (express or implied) showing that it was the intent of
the parties that a business venture be established; (b) an agreement for joint control and proprietorship; (c) a contribution of
money, property and/or services by the joint venturers; and (d) a
sharing of profits but not necessarily losses: 110

In Bussing v. Commissioner, m the taxpayer participated in a
multi-party equipment leasing arrangement in which the taxpayer
acquired an interest in copying equipment encumbered by a security interest and a triple net lease. The taxpayer, Bussing, paid
$10,000 in cash and $31,566 in promissory notes as a downpayment
with the balance of the purchase price offset by the rental income.
However, Bussing was entitled to a small percentage of any sublease rents received from the seller during the last three years of
any sublease. Bussing also entered into a marketing agreement appointing the seller as his agent in marketing the equipment and in
daily management decisions. For these services, the seller was entitled to receive 15% of the proceeds from any sale or lease of the
equipment plus marketing costs.
Under these facts, the Tax Court concluded that Bussing and his
seller/agent entered into a joint venture:
The several agreements executed by and between Bussing and [the
seller/agent], viewed as a whole, evidence an intent to join together
in a transaction in order to share profits and losses. First, each
party has contributed something of value to the venture - petitioner, his capital; AG, its services, business contacts and the
equipment subject to encumbrances. Second, each party has a significant interest in the rental and residual value of the equipment.
AG's loan to Handlesbank is paid down by Continentale's rent.
AG's "rent" to Bussing equals Bussing's "loan" payments to AG.
No losses are allocated to AG, but instead are allocated to Bussing
and the other investors in accordance with the interest acquired by
each. The substance of this transaction is that the parties are engaged in a joint venture - to invest in, lease and market the
Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429, 431 (1970) (quoting Haley v. Commissioner, 203
F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir. 1953)).
110
Id., citing Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Cal. 1959), and Tate v.
Knox, 131 F.Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1955).
111
88 T.C. 449 (1987).
109

HeinOnline -- 8 Va. Tax Rev. 898 1988-1989

Unauthorized Snow Removal

1989]

899

equipment. 112

If at the inception of the research the Partnership were economi-

cally but not legally compelled to enter into a license agreement
pursuant to which it would share profits from the technology, but
the Research Company had no right to force the Partnership to
sell or license the technology, then joint venture characterization
would be appropriate. The arrangement and the several agreements executed by and between the Partnership and the Research
Company, viewed as a whole, would evidence an intent to join together in a transaction to share profits and losses. First, each party
would have contributed something of value to the venture: as to
the Partnership, capital and marketing assistance; as to the Research Company, its services, experience, and the old technology.
Second, each party would have a significant interest in the successful marketing of the technology. If the Research Company exercised its option, it would benefit from the revenues generated by
the sublicensing of the technology. The Partnership in turn would
receive royalty payments. Thus, if the Partnership were economically compelled to license the technology to the Research Company, under Bussing and Podell, the Partnership and the Research
Company could be viewed as having entered into a joint venture to
develop and exploit the new technology. 113
In two cases under section 174, courts have addressed the issue
of the conditions under which a joint venture is formed between a
capital participant and a research participant. In Cleveland v.
Commissioner,w· the Fourth Circuit held that a joint venture was
formed upon the execution of a trust agreement. The agreement
provided that (1) the inventor would devote his full time efforts to
research and development; (2) the investor would contribute all of
the necessary funds; and (3) that the invention was jointly owned
and profits would be shared equally. The investor, Cleveland, provided capital to the venture and testified that he met weekly with
the inventor to discuss the progress of the research. All of the research was performed and controlled by the inventor. Although the
agreement did not purport to create a joint venture, the court held
that "the effect of the contractual provisions, considered as a
111

113
114

Id. at 461-62 (citations omitted).
See id.; Podell, 55 T.C. 429, 31.
34 T.C. 517 (1960), affd in part, rev'd in part, 297 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1961).
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whole, is to make the parties equal participants in a joint
venture. " 115
In a more recent case, Green v. Commissioner, 116 the Tax Court
ruled on the conditions under which it would hold that a joint venture had not been formed. In contrast to .Cleveland, the investor in
Green granted an exclusive license to the research contractor contemporaneous with the research and development agreement. As a
result, the capital participant never actually had ownership rights
in any new technology. As the Tax Court noted:
The present case is distinguishable from Cleveland because
LaSala, unlike the joint venture in Cleveland, had sold to NPDC
all its rights to any product that might result from the research,
and after the sale, LaSala, u,nlike the joint venture in Cleveland,
was not engaged in the business of developing the product. 117

Again, it appears that the only relevant factor in determining
entitlement to the section 174 deduction in the hypothetical is
whether the research was done on behalf of the Partnership. None
of the other factors mentioned by courts or the Service has independent significance.

5.

Amorphous Feeling of Abuse of the Tax System.

The Service apparently sees the Partnership in the hypothetical
as abusive when the situation is presented in the form of a syndicated "tax shelter." 118 The Service's view especially would be the
case if the research services were not paid for in cash but rather
were funded with a deferred payment obligation. But, consider the
"abusive" tax shelter that took place in Snow. In Snow, research
· and development deductions were allowed to individuals at their
relatively high rates of tax in the mid-1960s. 119 But, when it came
time to generate income, the parties put the technology into a corporation so that the income would be taxed at the relatively low
corporate rates applicable at that time. 120 This aspect of the case
110

ld. at 173.
83 T.C. 667 (1984). Green is discussed in detail at supra note 1 and notes 28 to 39.
117
Id. at 691.
116
See supra notes 28 to 39 and accompanying text.
119
The highest marginal rate of tax for individuals in 1960 was 87%. Stan. Fed. Tax Rep.
(CCH) 'il152, p. 7952.
120
The highest marginal corporate rate at that time was 52%. ld. at 11156, p. 7968.
116
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not discussed by any of the courts in the Snow case, and for
good reason - it was irrelevant to the section 174 issue - just as
the Commissioner's perception of abuse in the syndicated tax shelter context is irrelevant to the trade or business issue.
The Snow case clearly holds that research and development expenses are deductible even if incurred in the pre-opening phase of
a trade or business. The Partnership in the hypothetical is in the
pre-opening phase because a sufficient amount of continuous ongoing activity is being conducted on its behalf by the Research Company with the intent to earn a profit. As long as the research is
done on behalf of the Partnership, none of the other factors that
may be urged by the Service or referred to by courts in dicta has
any independent significance.
In dealing with research and development cases, the Service appears to be overly influenced by pure revenue considerations and a
dislike for tax advantaged transactions. Nonetheless, as the Tax
Court has noted in another case:
[W]e should not disregard the existence of an asset for which Congress intended tax advantages merely because the parties attempted to maximize the advantage of those benefits for one of the
parties to a transaction. [The Commissioner] should recognize that
in instances where there are not shams and depreciable assets exist, some person or entity is entitled to the intended tax
advantages. 121

This observation is no less applicable to deductions under section 174.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Green case and its progeny, by applying the incorrect rationale in reaching a correct result, have done the tax law a disservice. Bolstered by these cases, the Service has engaged in unauthorized "Snow removal" by ignoring the Supreme Court's position in
Snow, the importance of the "on behalf of' phrase in the Treasury's own regulations and the function which section 174 performs
in the tax law. Admittedly, the Service has done this in cases
colored by apparently meritless research designed primarily, if not
exclusively, to generate tax deductions for investors.
111

Leahy v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 56, 72 (1986).
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In adjudicating those cases, however, the Courts have failed to
provide guidance for other situations. They should have looked
past the cases that they were actually deciding and taken care that
their opinions could not be interpreted so broadly as to cut the
heart out of section 174 and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
that section. This article has provided a suggested analysis of the
"trade or business" issue which should allow the courts and the
Service to sharpen their focus on the truly abusive aspects of cases
which will arise. To proceed in any other way introduces unwarranted uncertainty to already risky business decisions involving research and development. As important, imprecise opinions also
create an unhealthy climate for analyzing cases involving other tax
incentive provisions.
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